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We Are Not Alone: 
Perception and the Others
Andrea Bucci
Abstract
In this paper, I have outlined an original Metaphysics of Perception which takes into
consideration some of  the most  common views about perception in the contemporary
debate. Then I will look at the consequences of this metaphysics about our perception of
others and what we know about them. In the third section, I suggest how to make sense
of certain neuroscientific discoveries about social perception and social cognition. In the
conclusion, I recap what has been done to say that others are what we can know after all.
Introduction
I would like to propose a metaphysics that considers the most important positions on the
metaphysics of perception in the contemporary debate, without rethinking them from the
beginning, and how it relates to our social perception and what we know about others.
The Intentionalist view, the versions of The Causal Theory of Perception coherent with
Indirect realism, some thesis of Naïve realism and so on will be the background of this
present work and, where not better specified, a silent one.
The  Metaphysics  of  Perception  I  have  outlined  focuses  on  the  composition  of  our
perceptual experience in its fundamental aspects as well as the position of people within
the perceptual experience. This first step will be followed by a discussion of the necessary
and  sufficient  condition  of  perception  and  by  the  discussion  of  the  role  that  our
phenomenal experience plays in perceptual activity.
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Having sketched the fundamental aspects of this Metaphysics of Perception, I will draw
some epistemological and metaphysical consequences that deal with the understanding
of what we can genuinely know and what cannot be directly known. At the end of the
chapter I will introduce a simple model appropriate to describe how this Metaphysics of
Perception works.
In  the  third  section,  I  will  consider  some  neuroscientific  examples  describing  the
functioning  of  brain  areas  in  elaboration  of  face  perception,  important  for  social
cognition, and a description of how the mirror neurons system works in social cognition. I
will  propose  a  way of  interpreting the neuroscientific  data that is  coherent with the
Metaphysics of Perception I want to propose. Then I will draw from some fundamental
aspects  of  the  functioning  of  central  nervous  system  and  from  the  interpretation  of
neuroscientific discoveries taken into consideration some epistemological consequences
about social cognition.
In  conclusion,  I  will  retrace  the  thesis  developed  in  the  first  three  sections  and
summarize my metaphysical  and epistemological  vision about human perception and
how  it  relates  to  social  perception  and  social  knowledge  as  well  as  the  relative
interpretations of some aspects of the brain functioning.
Sketching a Metaphysics of Perception
The Metaphysics I want to propose is a Threefold Metaphysics of Perception. It expresses
four related senses of perceiving in philosophical terms and three related subjects that
take part in a person’s perceptual activity.
First of all, as those who embrace an Indirect Realist account of The Causal Theory of
Perception  [1]  or  as  it  is  silently  embraced  by  those  who  deal  with  perception  at
neuroscientific level [2], I think that a causal nexus between the objects perceived as well
as the sensory organs and brain areas of a human living body in a conscious human
person who perceives is necessary for a proper discussion of perceptual activity; even
though, as argued by Grice, this causal link cannot be metaphysically proven:
    “The Causal Theory of Perception (CTP) has for some time received comparatively
little  attention,  mainly,  I  suspect,  because  it  has  generally  assumed that  the  theory
either  asserts  or  involves  as a  consequence the proposition that material  objects are
unobservable, and that the unacceptability of this proposition is sufficient to dispose of
the theory. [….] But it may be argued that (in which is perhaps a somewhat special sense
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of  consequence)  it  is  an unwanted  consequence  of  the  CTP that  material  object  are
unobservable:  for if  we accept the contention of  the CTP (1)  that perceiving is  to  be
analyzed in causal terms, (2) that knowledge about perceived objects depends on causal
inference,  and (3)  that the required causal  inference will  be unsound unless suitable
general principle of correspondence can be provided, then we shall admit that knowledge
about perceived object is unobtainable. […] Now an example of causal inference could be
an  inference  from  smoke  to  fire;  the  acceptability  of  such  an  inference  involves  the
possibility of establishing a correlation between occurrences of smoke and of fire; and this
is only possible because this is a way of establishing the occurrence of a fire other than by
causal inference.  But there is supposed to be no way of  establishing the existence of
particular material objects except by a causal inference from sense-impression; so such
inferences cannot be rationally justified. The specification of principles of correspondence
is of course an attempt to avert this consequence by rejecting the smoke-fire model (if
this model is rejected, recourse may be had to an assimilation of material objects to such
entities as electrons, the acceptability of which is regarded as being (roughly) a matter of
their  utility  for  the  purposes  of  explanation  and  prediction;  but  this  assimilation  is
repugnant for the reason that material objects, after having been first contrasted, as a
paradigm case of uninvented entities, with the theoretical constructs or entia rationis of
the scientist, are then treated as being themselves entia rationis).” [3]
From  a  theoretical  point  of  view,  a  way  to  base  the  Causal  Theory  of  Perception
metaphysically is an argument at the best explanation [4]: empirically we can argue that,
after having examined the everyday life experience and the results of  neuroscientific
research, it is very improbable that we are like a brain in a vat [5] or something similar.
Once the causal nexus is established, the phenomenal experience of the environment of
the human person composed by colored objects, persons, voices and so on is opened. The
human person at this level of perceptual activity is a colorful, solid and scented object as
are other colorful, solid and scented objects of phenomenal experience.
The third point of perceptual activity of a human person is the intentional, free activity
of  a conscious human person’s  attention to one object  or another of  the environment
opened by phenomenal experience. Only at this moment and at this metaphysical level
the ideas about perceptual activity of philosophers of perception like Naïve Realists and
Intentionalist can be properly understood. As a matter of fact, if we consider ourselves as
conscious people within the phenomenal experience, the Naïve Realist condition of an
experience being transparent is met.
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At the level  of  conscious person experience,  the  intentionalists  are  probably right  in
saying, that perception is an intentional relation to an intentional content even though
this is not the only level of perceptual activity. [6]
As shown by Searle:
    “The visual experience is as much directed at objects and states of affairs in the world
as any of the paradigm Intentional states that we discussed in the last chapter, such as
belief,  fear, or desire.  And the argument for this conclusion is simply that the visual
experience  has  conditions  of  satisfaction  in  exactly  the  same  sense  that  beliefs  and
desires have conditions of satisfaction. I can no more separate this visual experience from
the fact that it is an experience of a yellow station wagon than I can separate this belief
from the fact that it is a belief that it is raining; the “of” of “experience of” is in short the
“of” of Intentionality.(In both the cases of belief and visual experience).” [7]
On the other hand, this Metaphysics of Perception, despite the perception of the material
environment, is not direct at all. The phenomenal experience opened by the perceptive
faculty is completely transparent for the perceiving conscious person as an object among
other objects inner the phenomenal experience.
As  exposed  by  Martin  the  transparency  condition  can  be  retained  satisfied  if  a
Metaphysics of Perception can satisfy a description of reality like that:
    “When I stare at the straggling lavender bush at the end of my street, I can attend to
the variegated colours and shapes of leaves and branches, and over time I may notice
how they alter with the seasons. But I can also reflect on what it is like for me now to be
staring at the bush, and in doing so I  can reflect on particular aspects of  the visual
situation:  for  example  that  at  this  distance  of  fifty  metres  the  bush  appears  more
flattened than the rose bush which forms the boundary of my house with the street.
When my attention is  directed out at  the world,  the lavender  bush and its  features
occupy centre stage. It is also notable that when my attention is turned inwards instead
to my experience, the bush is not replaced by some other entity belonging to the inner
realm of the mind in contrast to the dilapidated street in which I live. I attend to what it
is like for me to inspect the lavender bush through perceptually attending to the bush
itself while at the same time reflecting on what I am doing. So it does not seem to me as
if there is any object apart from the bush for me to be attending to or reflecting on while
doing this.” [8]
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But this description is a description that every conscious person inner the phenomenal
experience  can  do  although what  is  transparent  are  not  the  material  objects  of  the
material  environment  in  themselves  but  the  material  environment  through  the
phenomenal experience. What seems to be a trick, the transparency of experience, taking
the three levels of this Metaphysics of Perception seriously, is perfectly legitimate from
the  experiential  point  of  view  of  a  conscious  person.  This  is  because,  as  we  have
previously seen,  given that the material  objects in themselves always remain hidden
after all,  our perceptual experience is the experience of  a conscious person inner the
phenomenal experience and nothing more.
Perceiving in the broader sense is what comes from the interaction of the previous three
levels of perception. For a person’s phenomenal experience to be the perception of an
object or situation it is required that the unconscious bodily subject must successfully
move inside the realm of the physical related objects or situations causally responsible
for the phenomenal experience when the conscious person moves inside the realm of the
phenomenal experience; this is the necessary condition.
The sufficient condition for a person’s phenomenal experience to be the perception of the
objects and situations causally responsible for the phenomenal experience is that, if the
unconscious bodily subject moves successfully inside the realm of the physical related
objects  or  situations  causally  responsible  for  the  phenomenal  experience,  then  the
conscious  person  has  to  move  successfully  inside  the  realm  of  the  phenomenal
experience.
Here the distinction between physical realm and experiential realm is not a distinction
between something that is physical and something that it is not; but it is the distinction
between the material objects that enter in physical relation with our sensory organs and
the correspondent phenomenal experience, although in scientific or philosophical terms
they can both be considered part of the physical realm.
If  what  has  been  said  so  far  is  true,  then  perception  activity  is  not  a  matching  or
representative  relation.  The  phenomenal  experience  is  an  interface  between  the
conscious  person  and  the  material  objects  of  the  material  environment  causally
responsible for the phenomenal experience. The conscious person acts on the material
environments through the phenomenal experience to which he takes part. Inversely to a
change  in  the  relation  between  human  body  and  material  objects  or,  better,  in  the
material environment included the human body corresponds to a change in phenomenal
experience.
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The perceptual experience as a unique activity comes from the interaction between the
human  body,  the  conscious  person  and  the  phenomenal  experience  ensured  by  the
activity  of  the  central  nervous  system.  The  continuous  updating  of  the  phenomenal
experience by the central nervous system translates changes in material environment,
including human body and material objects into changes in phenomenal experience. The
changes in the conscious person’s will are translated into behavioral processes through
the  awaited  results  of  the  human  person’s  voluntary  action  in  the  phenomenal
experience. This is how human life becomes practically possible.
Our phenomenal experience is the counterpart of the material environment with which
the human body is sensory related. Speaking not only about the human realm but also
animals, between an environmental physical situation and its phenomenal counterpart
there is not any particular or mandatory relation.
If an animal body moves successfully in its causally related physical environment when a
conscious animal moves in the causally corresponding phenomenal experience, then the
phenomenal experience is a good counterpart of the physical environment with which the
animal body is causally related.
For a poor and strange phenomenal experience of a non human conscious animal, the
animal, bodily considered as usual, can have a correspondently acceptable ability to live
in its environment.
To understand the importance of previous condition of perception we have to understand
that perception is a dynamic activity in every level of analysis of this Metaphysics of
Perception, which is a question that often is not considered at all.
As we see with Alva Noe:
    “Any account of perception that ignores this dependence of how things look on one’s
movements (that is, on changes in one’s relation to how things are), and in effect ignores
the  distinctively  perspectival  aspects  of  perceptual  content,  will  fail  to  provide  an
adequate account of what perception is.” [9]
The  gain  for  a  human  person  who  perceives  to  be  a  conscious  person  that  has  a
phenomenal experience through which he bodily moves in the material environments is
that, for a human person, there is something to know and something to adapt to a will of
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a  conscious  person,  the  opened  phenomenal  experience,  and  not  only  a  physical
stimulation to react to.
Moreover, it is senseless to ask if a human person can do what he does without being
conscious and without a phenomenal experience because a phenomenal experience has a
proper  character  and  the  phenomenal  experience  is  what  in  perception  a  conscious
person is aware of. The fact that “I take the black keys to my home” cannot be translated
in “ My body takes the keys to my home” simply because in the second case there is
nothing that is of some phenomenal type or consciously mine, in any sense, anyway.
To summarize when “I take the black keys to my home” I bodily act on an object thanks
to my ability to appreciate the particular hardness and color and resistance to my action
that make up my phenomenal experience of the keys in an allocentric point of view and
that is something I am aware of as a perceiving conscious person.
Taking this Metaphysics of Perception seriously, I will discuss some consequences of this
metaphysics about the objects that enters in perceptual activity and the knowledge that
we have about them from an epistemological and neuroscientific point of view.
The others are what we really know
Between the objects that enter in our perceptual experience there are others, the people
that  we  encounter  in  our  everyday  life.  While  other  objects  (except  for  non  human
animals) are characterized only by colors, smells, shape and so on of the phenomenal
experience that we have of them and, coherently with our Metaphysics of Perception
(that  they  do  not  materially  have),  other  people  are  characterized  by  particular
expressions, voices, movements and highly recognizable behaviors.
This means that the phenomenal experience associated to humans is something special
compared to perception of ordinary objects and richer than the perception we have of non
human animals too.
Moreover, it should be noted that, given this view of Metaphysics of Perception, while the
so called ordinary material objects are not made of what is considered proper of human
phenomenal experience we have of them, a human person is in his experience constituted
by a corporeity, his phenomenal appearance and his awareness as a conscious person.
Neither material objects nor human bodies we have said can be known properly because
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they are hidden from our human phenomenal experience despite their corporeity. The
fact that they have a body is well known in every action, objects movement and causal
relation between objects and bodies of our everyday life.
That a human person is in his experience constituted by a corporeity, his phenomenal
appearance  and  his  consciousness  as  a  conscious  person  is  true  because  we  know
ourselves  and  we  take  ourselves  as  ourselves  within  the  conscious  and phenomenal
experience. Moreover, and more importantly, thanks to the fact that, to a considerable
extent my perceptual faculty and phenomenal experience of others are very similar, one’s
phenomenal experience of another person is like the phenomenal experience that person
has of himself.
We have already noted that the richness of phenomenal experience of people is much
higher than that of ordinary objects and animals. It is also comparable to other humans
as their phenomenal experience is, at least in its “external features”, as rich as the one I
have of myself.
That  said,  we can conclude  that  while  we cannot  know properly  material  objects  in
ourselves nor non human animals, we can properly know ourselves and the others in our
place inner the phenomenal experience in which we take part.
From a Metaphysical point of view we do not know if others perceive as we do and if they
are like us and in any respect human. It is possible that others are something extremely
different to me and that they are not human at all. But from an empirical point of view
there are too many things that make me think that what I take to be human and similar
to me in phenomenal experience is really what I take them to be.
A model that can express what has just been said is what I will call the Aquarium model
from now on. I am a red fish in an aquarium, I can see other objects and myself in the
aquarium only through the water, my phenomenal experience. I do not know that I am in
an  aquarium  and  the  awareness  of  being  in  an  aquarium  does  not  really  make  a
difference.  What  the  water  lets  me  see  about  me  is  my  experience  of  my  visible
appearance and my experience inner the aquarium is a part of what I am; the life in the
aquarium is the only life I can live. While the other objects are unknowable except for
how they are in the aquarium, I am not alone. The others, red fish like me, join me at
least in my phenomenal life and I can recognize them to be similar to me.
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Neuroscience and the others. Say the same things with other words.
From a neuroscientific point of view it is well known that the doors and the barriers to
the central nervous system are the sensory organs. The doors because the nervous signal
departs from the retina, the receptive cells of the skin and so on are the first steps in the
elaboration of the stimuli of the physical environment. The barriers because all that has
the  phenomenology  of  the  mental  like  our  phenomenal  experience  is  the  product,
coherently with the Metaphysics of Perception exposed, of the central nervous system
beginning with what departed from the sensorial nervous signals.
In a sense the perceptive phenomenology and in particular the phenomenology of the
human persons that we encounter in our everyday life is something that comes from the
dynamic activities of  some areas or maybe all  areas,  in a holistic  perspective,  of  the
central nervous system.
With Rizzolatti talking about emotions of the others:
    “As in the case of action understanding, it is likely that emotions are understood in
two  ways.  The  first  is  through  a  cognitive  elaboration  of  the  sensory  information
captured during the observation of others’ emotion, the other is through a direct mapping
of this sensory information onto the motor structures that determines the experience of
the  observed  emotion  in  the  observer.  These  two  ways  of  recognizing  emotions  are
profoundly different. With the first, the observer understand the emotion expressed by
others, but does not feel it. He deduces it. A certain facial or body pattern mean fear
another happiness. There is no emotional involvement. With the other mechanism. The
recognition  occurs  because  the  observed  emotions  triggers  in  the  observer  the  same
emotional state. It is direct first person recognition.” [10]
Although for many philosophers cognition plays its part in perceptual activity, I will not
be examining this topic. Rather, we will look at the second branch of the above citation,
when facial and behavioral recognition directly involve a first person response. This is
because of the fact that the human conscious person inner the phenomenal experience is
intentionally involved in perceptual activity already explained during the description of
the previous Metaphysics of Perception.
__________________________________________
Page 9 / 14 | Copyright © BRAINFACTOR 2018
BRAINFACTOR | REG. TRIB. MILANO N. 538 18/9/2008 | ISSN 2035-7109 | DIR. RES. MARCO MOZZONI | EDIZIONE 4/10/2018
Let us first consider the neuroscientific works concerning face recognition. Here it is well
known that there are specific neural areas for the elaboration of visual information.
As seen with Rolls:
    “Considerable specialization of function is found in the architectonically defined areas
of temporal visual cortex (Baylis et al., 1987; Rolls, 2008a) (Figure 4.1). Areas TPO, PGa
and  IPa  are  multimodal,  with  neurons  that  respond  to  visual,  auditory  and/or
somatosensory inputs; the inferior temporal gyrus and adjacent areas (TE3, TE2, TE1,
Tea, and TEm) are primarily unimodal visual areas; areas in the cortex in the anterior
and dorsal part of the superior temporal sulcus (e.g. TPO, IPa, and IPg) have neurons
specialized for the analysis of moving visual stimuli; and neurons responsive primarily to
faces  are found more  frequently  in areas  TPO,  Tea,  and TEm, where  they comprise
approximately 20% of the visual neurons responsive to stationary stimuli, in contrast to
the other temporal cortical areas where they comprise 4% to 10%. The stimuli which
activate other cells in these TE regions include simple visual patterns such as gratings,
and combinations of simple stimulus features (Gross et al., 1985; Tanaka et al., 1990).
Due to the fact that face-selective neurons,  though found in high proportion in some
subregions  (Tsao  et  al.,  2006),  nevertheless  are  found  in  lower  proportions  in  many
temporal lobe architectonic regions (Baylis et al.,1987), it might be expected that only
large  lesions,  or  lesions  that  interrupt  outputs  of  these  visual  areas,  would  produce
readily apparent face-processing deficits.” [11]
This description of the discoveries about face elaboration by the central nervous system
is a neutral description; neutral because it is probably one of the most basic descriptions
free  from  one  or  another  of  the  philosophic  positions  in  neuroscience  concerning
perception and face perception.
Following the metaphysics sketched in the first two sections, the best way to interpret
this data is not what seems to be the natural one, that is to say that the brain areas
active during the face observation are the areas responsible for the elaboration of this
observational data. On the contrary, at least some of these areas are responsible for the
production of the public phenomenal experience that we have of others when they enter
in one’s receptive field and the remaining areas are responsible for our social detection of
faces as intelligent conscious persons from an individual perspective.
The phenomenal experience is something to retain public because although two different
agents  cannot  have  exactly  the  same phenomenal  experience  at  the  same time,  the
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things and the phenomenal character of what they see are the same. According to the
previous model, they stay in the same aquarium after all.
If  this interpretation is  correct,  the  role  of  mirror  neuron system in social  cognition
regards the human conscious person inner the phenomenal experience.
Rizzolatti says:
    “Humans  understand  disgust,  and  most  likely  other  emotions,  through  a  direct
mapping  mechanism.  The  observation  of  emotionally  laden  actions  activates  those
structures that that give a first person experience of the same actions. By means of this
activation a bridge is created between ourselves and the others” (…) [12]
Mirror neurons in my non neutral interpretation provide the link between my emotions
and others’  emotions producing a particular and complex human experience within a
certain  phenomenal  experience  of  others.  In  a  sense,  it  is  only  because  our  central
nervous system is able to produce a phenomenal experience of others and something like
a conscious person that others can enter in our phenomenal experience. We are not alone
because, although in mine perspective the human phenomenal experience is a production
of the central nervous system, inside which material objects take their role. As conscious
persons  we  are  conscious  persons  with  other  conscious  persons  within  our  similar
phenomenal experience. In a sense, taking others for what they seem to be, it is very
unlikely that we are always wrong.
From an epistemological point of view, the Metaphysics of perception discussed till now
and the interpretation of neuroscientific data have some important consequences.
As I have said, if my phenomenal experience is something due to the brain elaboration,
and if what is elaborated is the output of the receptive cells of our sensory organs and
nothing more, then what we can know are not the objects in themselves but the objects
through the phenomenal experience or through the help of some instruments that play
the  role  of  artificial  sensory  organs.  The  sensory  organs  translate  environmental
stimulation in brain signals, measure instruments translate environmental stimulation
in numbers to be interpreted, to say in the simplest way possible.
Moreover, what we genuinely know as conscious persons is first of all our phenomenal
experience  and  then  all  that  comes  from  our  phenomenal  experience.  And  because
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human persons are  what  they  are  exactly  as  conscious  persons  inner  a  phenomenal
experience  and we have at  least  a  partial  phenomenal  experience  of  the  others  like
conscious persons inner our phenomenal experience; while the other objects inner the
phenomenal experience are not like they are as material objects, we can get closer to the
knowledge of the others as they are in themselves that is as conscious persons inner ours
similar phenomenal experience. For first and in other words, what we can really know
are the others and nothing more.
Conclusions
In the first section of this papers I have sketched a Metaphysics of perception that puts
in the spotlight three related subjects present during perceptual experience; the material
body of a human person, the phenomenal subject as a part of the phenomenal experience
and the human conscious person who can move towards the phenomenal  experience.
Their existence is guaranteed and verifiable by everyone in their ordinary experience
once the metaphysical perspective is understood.
The  theoretical  basis  of  the  Metaphysics  of  Perception  proposed  is  a  causal  view of
perception in line with Indirect realism. On this basis I have shown that perception is
composed by a phenomenal experience and a conscious person inner the phenomenal
experience who perceive in the intentional sense of perceiving. At this point the ideas of
Naïve Realists have been made clear,  the request  for transparence of  the perceptual
experience is satisfied by the openness of phenomenal experience at the conscious person
level of perception.
After that, I have given necessary and sufficient condition for a human person to have a
working perceptual faculty in terms of fitness to an a living environment and I have
discussed the relations between the human body as a material object between material
objects, the phenomenal experience and the human conscious person.
From a metaphysical point of view I showed the gain to be conscious person inner a
phenomenal  experience  and given an answer to  who thinks that the condition to  be
conscious person in a phenomenal experience is something eliminable.
Sketched a Metaphysics of perception in the first section, in the second section I have
argued some metaphysical consequence regarding our knowledge of the others and the
fundamental distinction between knowledge of objects and knowledge of persons from a
metaphysical  and  epistemological  point  of  view.  What  I  argue  is  the  priority  of  the
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knowledge of others over any other kind of phenomenal knowledge like that of objects of
non human animals.
To explain how the perceptual experience seems to work, I have provided simple model
called the Aquarium model.
In  the  third  section,  I  took  some  elements  to  the  neuroscientific  approach  to  social
perception such as  perception of  faces  and its  link with  mirror  neurons  system and
showed how it  is  possible  to  talk  about  neuroscientific  discoveries  neutral  to  one  or
another philosophic thought in a way that is coherent with the previous Metaphysics of
perception.
Done that, it turned out that the epistemological conclusions of the exposed Metaphysics
of Perception regarding the knowledge of others and the epistemological conclusions of
the interpretation of  neuroscientific  data  about some fundamental  elements  of  social
perception are exactly the same. We are not alone, others are what we can really know.
Andrea Bucci
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